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Abstract 
This paper studies the roles of a bank in a conglomerate, roles which are best investigated during a 
bad period. We examine two hypotheses using Taiwan’s unique bank loan transaction data. Firstly, 
our extended liquidity constrained hypothesis which argues that during a bad period, investments 
of firms in a non-bank group are more severely constrained than they are during a normal period 
cannot be rejected. The same argument, however, does not hold true for firms in a bank group. 
Secondly, our extended liquidity insurance hypothesis which argues that during a bad period, firms 
can obtain funds only when they are in a bank group with a financially related core business is also 
accepted. When they are in a bank group with a core business unrelated to finance, the hypothesis 
is not expected to hold. 
Key words: Extended Liquidity Constrained Hypothesis, Extended Liquidity Insurance Hypothe-
sis, Bank Group. 
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I. Introduction 
The number of studies pertaining to the role a bank plays in a conglomerate recently has been in-
tensified. In earlier studies, the presence of a bank in a group1 has, for the most part, been deemed 
as beneficial. For example, the main bank in a Japanese keiretsu can provide liquidity to its group 
affiliates, making them less vulnerable to economic shocks and financial constraints. Moreover, it 
is simply for firms in a group to obtain cheaper funding sources. Only recently, however, have 
researchers begun to challenge such notions, contending that including a bank in a group involves 
additional costs. As a case in point, a group may choose to maximize stability rather than profits, 
which means that their bank may not provide either liquidity or cheaper funding to distressed firms 
(See Ferris, Kim and Kitsabunnarat, 2003; Claessens, Fan and Lang, 2002).  Pre-announced bene-
fits may not in fact be realized. The question as to the precise role of a bank in a conglomerate, 
therefore, has yet to be resolved. Understanding the functions of a bank in a group can provide 
useful insight vis-à-vis business strategies for conglomerates. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the liquidity role of banks; this is best understood in con-
glomerate when Taiwan business group data during a bad period are used. We propose two hy-
potheses to examine this issue. First, we especially consider the 1997 Asian crisis into the conven-
tional “liquidity constrained hypothesis” for firms in a bank group and firms in a non-bank group. 
The hypothesis asserts the view that during a normal period, member firms with a positive net pre-
sent value (NPV) should not be financially constrained because their affiliated banks can provide 
them with liquidity whenever required. The rationale for this is that a close banking relationship 
can reduce the likelihood of having asymmetric information and hence, a firm with a positive NPV 
can obtain funds from outsiders (see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein, 1991 and the literature review in the next section). There are, however, opposing 
views in this regard (see next section). This paper contending that the liquidity role of a bank is
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strengthened during a bad period and hence, firms in a bank group during Asian crisis should not 
be liquidity constrained while firms in a non-bank group will. We simply refer it to the “extended 
liquidity constrained hypothesis”. 
The role of a bank during a crisis period can also be examined by adopting the “liquidity insurance 
hypothesis”, which describes the role of a bank when a firm in the same group suddenly confronts the 
risk of liquidity. The hypothesis asserts that an affiliated bank is able to guarantee the provision of 
liquidity to those firms which are considered to be worth rescuing. Tilly (1989) advocated this hy-
pothesis by arguing that banks typically cut loans in a plunging economy because of firms’ worsen-
ing balance sheets and a decreased net value of collateral. See also Abegglen and Stalk (1985) and 
Suzuki and Wright’s (1985) for the similar argument.  The difference in our approach to testing this 
hypothesis consists in the fact that we further divide bank groups into non-financial core bank 
groups and financial core bank groups based on their core business though both of them contain a 
bank. The core business of the former is not related to finance whereas that of the latter is1. Because 
previous studies have seldom classified bank groups on the basis of their core businesses, their re-
sults may not be robust. This core business argument is referred to as the “extended liquidity insur-
ance hypothesis”. We find that banks in non-financial core bank groups tended to rescue distressed 
firms during the 1997 Asian crisis, while those in financial core bank groups did not.  
Our methodology of answering this question differs slightly from those in the literature. Because 
the investigation of this topic is best to have individual loan transaction data, which is typically not 
available in most countries, past studies have been based on firms’ financial ratios to indirectly 
examine the similar issues (Ferris et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2002). We overcome this problem 
by collecting Taiwan’s bank loan transaction data laboriously, including loan contracts between 
firms and banks, such as loan rates, loan amounts, collateral, borrowers’ and lenders’ names, and 
so on. As such, we have a grip on the borrowing rates and amounts from member banks in the 
same group (hereafter member bank, MB) and from non-member banks in a different group (here-
after non-member bank), which allows us to directly test our hypothesis. This means that this 
study, unlike others, is a more direct evaluation of the hypothesis. 
The next section briefly surveys the extended liquidity constrained hypothesis and extended liquid-
ity insurance hypothesis. The third section introduces the business groups and data sources. Sec-
tion IV lays out the model specifications, and Section V reports the estimated results. The last sec-
tion presents some concluding remarks. 
II. Hypotheses: The Role of a Bank in Conglomerates 
Liquidity, or internal funds, is more attractive as a source of corporate investment given the infor-
mation asymmetry between borrowers and lenders as well as incentive problems arising from the 
dilution of ownership stake due to external financing for the managers controlling the firms. With 
closer monitoring by main banks, Japanese firms might be expected to be little constrained in their 
investments. In other words, the investment of firms with a main bank might be less sensitive to 
firm liquidity. Several studies on the Japanese MB find them to have a significant role in mitigat-
ing liquidity constraints for corporate investment. Investment was found to be less sensitive to 
liquidity (or long-term debt) for firms with a MB or stronger links to a MB in terms of the level or 
stability of MB loan share, and MB ownership share (Hoshi et al., 1991; Mori, 1994). Sheard 
(1985) makes an indirect test of the same question, finding that the speed of employment adjust-
ment in a financial crisis tends to be slower for firms with a strong MB relationship (in terms of 
ownership and loan shares of MB, etc.). This is seen as the result of their being less liquidity con-
strained. Hayashi (1982), however, finds no evidence that MB ties mitigate the firm’s liquidity 
constraints. For German firms, Elston and Albach (1995) find some evidence that firms with sig-
nificant bank ownership stakes had no liquidity constraints in the 1980s, unlike firms without a 
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bank block holder. However, Fohlin (1998) finds that German firms with bank attachments, or 
even long-term bank relationships, were not associated with any significant reduction in their li-
quidity sensitivity of investment or rate of investment for the period from 1903 to 1913, the forma-
tive years of universal banking. For publicly traded U.S. firms, Houston and James (1996) find 
that firms relying on a single bank were significantly more cash flow constrained in the period 
from 1980 to 1993. The investment sensitivity to liquidity increased monotonically in the ratio of 
bank debt to total debt outstanding, an indication that they faced higher costs of external financing. 
They also held larger stocks of liquid assets and had lower dividend payout rates. On the other 
hand, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) also find that MB clients had significantly better access to capi-
tal prior to 1980 than other firms, an advantage which largely disappeared following the financial 
liberalization in the early 1980s. 
Although Japanese firms with strong MB relationships seem to have been better assisted than 
those without such relationships during financial distress, how do Japanese firms in general com-
pare with their American counterparts? Hall and Weinstein (2000) examine the investment behav-
ior of U.S. and Japanese firms after the onset of financial distress. They find that financial distress 
causes R&D to fall in both countries by approximately the same amount, and that Japanese firms 
do not invest more than US firms after the onset of distress. Results for small and medium-sized 
Korean firms are provided by Ferri, Kang and Kim (2000). As expected, they find that, for firms 
with strong pre-crisis relationship banking, outstanding loans decreased less, the drops in credit 
lines were smaller after the crisis, and the chance of building (increasing) their loans in arrears in 
1998 (the year of the sharpest liquidity constraints) was lower (for previously non-delinquent 
firms). 
A. Extended Liquidity Constrained Hypothesis   
In a perfect capital market, the level of investment should only be related to a project’s NPV be-
cause internal and external funds are substitutable. Hence, Q  should be the only determinant of 
investment. However, in the real world, the capital market is far from perfect, and it could be that a 
project with a positive NPV is not financed on account of asymmetric information. In this case, an 
independent firm, which does not belong to any business group, has to rely on its internal funds for 
a project. This problem of asymmetric information is mitigated in a bank-conglomerate since a 
bank has inside information on its associated firms’ projects. Given this scenario, external and 
internal funds are substitutable for projects within a bank-conglomerate (See Hoshi et al., 1991). 
Past studies which have tested this hypothesis by investigating the coefficients of cash flow in an 
investment function have identified a significant cash flow coefficient, implying that proceeding 
with an investment relies on internal funds and suggesting that firms are either liquidity con-
strained, or not at all. In other words, independent firms are expected to have financial constraints, 
while group firms in a bank conglomerate are not. 
Past empirical studies investigating liquidity constrained have examined the significance of the 
coefficients of cash flow in the regression of investment. Cash flow in group firms should be in-
significant, unlike that in independent firms which should be significant. Finding which provides 
substantive evidence of this abound. Hoshi et al. (1991) used Japanese data and argued that be-
cause of the Japanese main bank system (keiretsu), group firms are well known by their banks, and 
thus the problem of asymmetric information is reduced to a minimum. Their results support the 
liquidity constrained hypothesis. Also using Japanese data, Kaplan and Minton (1994), Gibson 
(1995), Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) have reached the same conclusion. Other studies, 
including those of Gorton and Schmid (2000), who have employed data from Germany, and Shen 
and Wang (2005), who have used data from Taiwan, have lent further support for the hypothesis. 
Opposing evidence, albeit less abundant, also exists. Fohlin (1998), for one, has found that invest-
ment is more sensitive to internal liquidity for bank-networked firms than for independent firms and 
has, therefore, flatly rejected the hypothesis. Taking a slightly different approach, Ferris et al. (2003) 
have recently explored this issue and have shown a Korean chaebol in declining industries which 
continue to make capital expenditures, a managerial behavior they term the over-investment hypothe-
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sis. They have regressed a firm’s excess value on the proxy of over-investment and determined the 
coefficient to be significantly negative, thereby fully supporting their hypothesis. Though mixed re-
sults have been found when this has been tested, this hypothesis should be more acceptable during a 
crisis period because of a greater amount of severe asymmetric information. 
B. Extended Liquidity Insurance Hypothesis 
During a bad year, when a firm faces a greater risk of bankruptcy on account of liquidity risk, a 
bank in the same conglomerate is capable of functioning as an insurer. That is, a bank in a group 
can bail out its affiliated distressed firms, which is the basis of the liquidity insurance hypothesis.  
As stated earlier, Tilly (1989) has advanced stressed this hypothesis by claiming that banks typi-
cally cut loans when the economy is in a downturn because of firms’ worsening balance sheets and 
a decreased net value of collateral. It should follow then that banks in a group could provide li-
quidity to the affiliated distressed firms. Abegglen and Stalk (1985) cited the case of one automo-
bile manufacturer, Mazda, and its bank conglomerate, the Sumitomo group, as an example. When 
Mazda was in financial distress during the 1970s, the managing director of the Sumitomo Bank 
assumed leadership of the firm and led it out of financial trouble. Nakatani (1984), a former head 
of the Sumitomo Bank, stated: 
“…We are always prepared to help out when a member is in trouble. We won’t allow any group 
member companies to go into business failures…” 
Also, see Aoki (1990) who has taken a similar stance.   
Still more evidence has been found. Suzuki and Wright’s (1985) study, for instance, showed that 
in times of financial distress, Japanese companies with strong bank ties are more likely to avoid 
bankruptcy than are those without close ties1. Gibson (1995) sampled 1,355 Japanese firms to ex-
plore the same issue and found that on the grounds that severe credit rationing is expected in bad 
years, it is harder for firms without a main bank to pass through a period of financial distress. See 
also Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) who take a similar view. 
This research distinguishes itself from others because here business groups are divided into bank 
groups and non-bank groups, where the former denote those business groups containing at least 
one bank as a member but the latter do not. A great deal of the literature has divided firms into 
group firms and independent firms (Hoshi et al., 1991), and then performed statistical tests on the 
argument of financial constraints. This has implicitly assumed that each business group has a 
member bank.  We feel it is important to point out that while this is true for Japan and Germany, it 
is not necessarily so in many other countries. A Korean chaebol (a business group), for example, 
does not employ a main bank system and, thus, may not have a member bank (Bae, Kang and Lim, 
2002). Similarly, two-thirds of Taiwan’s business groups do not have a member bank. It can there-
fore justifiably be claimed that it is more likely for a business group not to have a member bank. 
III. Data Sources and Basic Statistics 
A. Bank and Non-Bank Conglomerates in Taiwan 
The policy-makers in most countries have also tried to make the firewall between banks and firms 
more effective, and in particular, made restrictions on related-party loans more stringent. While the 
principle of an individual corporate ownership ceiling of 4% was maintained, exceptions have 
been introduced to allow larger ownership by investors who specialize in financial institutions. 
Regulations on bank ownership by industrial capitals (large business groups with diversified op-
eration in non financial sectors) have been gradually strengthened to discourage chaebols from 
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coordinating role of the bankruptcy courts. 
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trying to take control of banks in an effort to secure loans on easy terms. Industrial capitals are 
prohibited from purchasing more than 4% of the shares of a bank with borrowed money and are 
required to obtain permission from the government even when they want to purchase more than 
4% with their own equity. On other hand, the ownership by a business group is common, particu-
larly in Malaysia, but the major creditor bank rarely belongs to the same business group as the firm 
in any of the countries surveyed. In Indonesia, the major creditor banks are just as likely to be for-
eign controlled as to be controlled by business groups. As for unions, these are found in 80% of 
the Indonesian firms, 66% of the Korean firms, 40% of the Malaysian firms, and only 20% of the 
Thai firms. 
The definition of a business group and its affiliates is an elusive concept since an academic defini-
tion may not always be fully consistent with the practical one. For example, there is no single defi-
nition when it comes to how many subsidiaries, assets, or other criteria are required for firms to be 
classified as a group. While a group affiliate is often defined as having a share of about 10%, 15% 
or 20% owned by other firms, in reality, it is not easy to identify the final controller because of 
actual pyramid holdings and cross-shareholdings. In light of this, here, we adopt the definition of a 
business group as reported in various issues of Business Groups in Taiwan (BGIT), published by 
the China Credit Information Service (CCIS)1.  The CCIS defines a business group as one, which 
contains at least three firms. In an almost anecdotal way, this definition excludes some business 
groups which only contain two affiliates though their total assets are large and their brand names 
are extremely well-known in Taiwan society2.  
Our sample selection is based on the BGIT classification with modifications.  First, a conglomer-
ate is defined as a bank group provided that it owns at least a 5% share of a bank’s equity; other-
wise, it is a non-bank group. The cutoff of 5% is based on statutes in the Taiwan Bank Law that 
stipulates that the same person or entity is not allowed to hold more than a 5% share of a bank’s 
equity3.  Next, to avoid any possible effects derived from regulations, i.e., non-market factors, we 
exclude state-owned and political party-owned (such as business groups owned by the previous 
ruling party, the Kuomintang) business groups and the group of the public utility industries from 
our sample. Third, a subsidiary is selected only if it has belonged to the same conglomerate for the 
whole sample period used here, i.e., 1994-2001. Last, only listed and non-listed companies with 
financial information being available to the public are adopted owing to data availability. The 
listed companies include those listed on the Taiwan Security Exchange Corporation (the TSEC) 
and in the Over-the-Counter Market (the OTC)4. 
Table 1 lists the 15 bank conglomerates with their group names, their affiliated bank names, the 
percentage of shares held by the final ultimate ownership, their core businesses, other non-
financially and financially related businesses, and the characteristics of the group business.  With 
regard to final ownership, the calculation of which is based on La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens 
et al. (2000), three numbers are reported. The first and second are, respectively, the direct and indi-
rect controlling rights by the ultimate controlling shareholder. The third number in parentheses is 
the total ownerships of controlling right. While La Porta et al. (1999) have suggested using 20% as 
the threshold to decide final ownership, Yeh and Woidtke (2005), Shen and Wang (1999) have 
advanced the notion that 15% may be more appropriate for Taiwan. As shown in the table, the 
percent of shares held are mostly above 15%. The core businesses reported by the CCIS are mainly 
determined from interviews and questionnaires. 
                                                          
1 The CCIS is a government-supported company, which is mainly engaged in the collection of borrowers’ credit information.   
2 For example, the Lian-Bon Bank Group only contains the Lian-Bon Bank and Freedom Newspaper, and the Won-Tai 
Bank Group only contains Won-Tai Bank and Prince Automobile. While both groups are well-known in Taiwan, neither is 
included because only two firms are in each group. 
3 The same article also states that: persons or entities with “inter-related relations” who previously served as directors, 
supervisors, or managers, and the judicial persons or other organizations in which such bank personnel served as represen-
tatives or managers are treated as the same person. The statute, however, does not exclude the possibility of pyramid-
holding or cross-shareholdings. Also, see Shen (1998). 
4 In Taiwan, this type of company is not listed on the TSEC but is still required to release its financial statements to the public.  
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Table 2 reports the 152 non-bank conglomerates, but because of space limitations, we do not re-
port each group’s affiliates. We present the core businesses of these groups by type of industry, 
i.e., equity securities (8), international trade (3), electronics (30) and traditional industry (111), 
where the number of groups in each industry is indicated in parentheses. Worth noting is that the 
traditional industrial groups account for two-thirds of the non-bank groups, and among these, only 
three are in the international trade industry.  
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the number of firms included in the bank and non-bank groups. 
Within the bank groups (reported in the first column), 57 are listed companies, 151 publicly avail-
able financial information firms, and 89 fall into the remaining categories.  Thus, the first two 
categories, which amount to 208 firms (=57+151), constitute our sample of firms making up the 
bank groups1.  As concerns the non-bank groups, 295 are listed companies, 554 are publicly avail-
able financial information firms, and 108 are in the remaining categories. Thus, the first two cate-
gories, totaling 849 firms (=295+554), comprise our sample of firms in the non-bank groups. The 
panel at the bottom of Table 3 shows the subsidiary distribution across the same five industries. In 
the bank groups, 25, 28, 41, 52, and 69 firms belong to the banking and insurance, equity securi-
ties, international trade, electronic and the traditional industries, respectively. As for the non-bank 
groups, the number of firms in these five industries is respectively 9, 23, 94, 295 and 401. 
B. Loan Transaction Data 
Once we have the above required information to distinguish the bank groups and non-bank 
groups, we collect the loan transaction data. In Taiwan, like in many countries, listed companies 
are required to send their balance sheets and income statements to the local authority (the TSEC in 
this case). When sending these publicly available financial statements, however, companies in 
Taiwan are also obligated to send a long-format financial statement to describe how each item in 
the two publicly available financial statements is compiled2. This long format financial statement, 
though it is not directly available to the public, can be obtained simply by applying for permission 
to xerox a copy. A long-format financial statement records all borrowing transaction data the com-
pany has made, including loan rates, loan amounts, loan maturity and sometimes the value of its 
collateral. The names of lenders (i.e., banks) are also available. See Shen (2002) for details about 
these data. Based on this loan contract information, as well as on that of the groups and their affili-
ates, the evaluation of the two hypotheses is on a direct basis. Furthermore, since the borrowers 
and banks are known, we collect the data on the assets of firms and banks from the Taiwan Eco-
nomic Journal, (hereafter, the TEJ), a private data vending company in Taiwan.  
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the terms of the loan contracts for each of the bank 
groups and non-bank groups. To investigate the borrowing conditions between firms and banks 
when they are in the same group and when they are not in the same group, we further divide both 
borrowing conditions on the basis of firms borrowing from affiliated banks and those that borrow 
from non-affiliated banks. It is not surprising that the number of loan contracts for the non-bank 
groups is three times that for the bank groups given that the former include much more firms. The 
average borrowing rate of firms in the bank groups is 7.65% and in the non-bank groups it is 
7.95%. It is interesting to note that the borrowing rate from affiliated banks (7.71%) is modestly 
higher than the rate from non-member banks (7.58%), but this difference is not significant. This 
finding has also been reported in recent studies by Wang and Shen (2004). To explain, the severe 
relationship-lending restrictions in the Taiwan Bank Law, Articles 32 and 33, explicitly stipulate 
that the lending rates of banks to the same group’s firms should not be less than that of other firms 
with an equivalent credit history (which is an equal based principle for relationship-lending). Also, 
any lending amount to a firm in the same group that exceeds 100 million must be approved by the 
bank’s board of director3. Accordingly, although a member bank may be willing to provide 
cheaper funds, the law, to a certain extent, excludes this possibility.  
                                                          
1 We use only the first two categories because of the availability of data. 
2 The long-format financial statement in Chinese means “detailed” financial statement, see Shen (2002) for details. 
3 See Shen (1998) for the description of Articles 32 and 33 of the Taiwan Bank Law. 
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 Similarly, among the three categories in Table 4, the smallest borrowing amount is from a bank in 
the same group, whereas the largest is from a bank in a non-bank group. The average borrowing 
maturity is 2.95 years for a non-bank group, followed by 3.37 years for bank group borrowing 
from a member bank and 3.42 years for the bank group affiliates borrowing from non-member 
banks. 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) find that the lending interest rate spread was significantly negatively 
affected by the MB (the largest short-term lender) loan ratio in total debt during the 1982-1995 
period for exchange-listed Japanese firms. However, the finding applied mainly to medium-sized 
companies, not for large firms. Based on the US National Survey of Small Business Finance, Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1994) find that the interest rates charged are little affected by the length of rela-
tionship or multiple services; while multiple banks are associated with a significantly higher rate. 
Relying on the same data set, Berger and Udell (1995) focus exclusively on lending under lines of 
credit, which represents more “relationship-driven” loans. They find that borrowers with longer 
banking relationship pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998), however, observe that Japanese MBs extracted significant rents through higher-
than-average lending rates before the liberalization of the financial markets in the 1980s. Angelini, 
Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) also find that lending rates tend to increase with the length of the bank-
firm relationship in Italy. In Germany, relationship banking is found to have no major impact on 
loan pricing (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998). 
IV. Econometric Model  
Table 5 defines all variables in the two econometric models of our two hypotheses. 
A. Extended Liquidity Constrained Hypothesis  
Our first model, which is borrowed from Hoshi et al. (1991), is employed to examine the extended 
liquidity constrained hypothesis, which simultaneously takes both normal and bad times into ac-
count. That is:      
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where  j = 1, for the bank groups;   
        = 2, for the non-bank groups; 
subscript i denotes the i-th firms; t denotes the t-th period; and I denotes the flow amounts of gross 
investment and is calculated as the changing amounts of gross investment. Specifically, I  is 
measured as the change in the level of expenditures on plant, property, and equipment. When firms 
in the bank groups are employed, j=1; otherwise, it is equal to 2. 
Variable Q denotes Tobin’s Q. Here, our Q is the average Q1, which is measured as the ratio of the 
market value of the outstanding stocks divided by the book value of total assets taken to the re-
placement costs in the next period ( 1+tQ ). Term 1+tQ  controls future investment opportunities. PD 
represents the firm’s production and stands for the proxy of the income effects from investment, 
                                                          
1 Some have argued that marginal Q should be used instead of the average Q; see the discussion by Hayashi (1982). In 
reviewing such studies, the variety and complexity of the procedures used to estimate q are striking. Perfect and Kenneth 
(1994) have presented a good summary of different methods and their deficiencies. In this paper, the common method 
described by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) is used.   
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where production is defined as “sales plus change in the final inventory of goods”. This is the ac-
celerator effect in the literature pertaining to empirical investments despite the absence of any 
compelling theory behind it. Term K denotes the capital, which is equal to long-term debt plus 
equity and serves as a scale variable.  
Term Liq is the index of liquidity, which is typically proxied by a corporate operating cash flow 
(OCF) (see Hoshi et al., 1991; Gibson, 1995). However, Houston and James (2001) have sug-
gested using corporate cash and its equivalents (CASH) as an alternative measure. This cash and its 
equivalents are the sum of cash holdings and short-term securities, the latter of which are readily 
convertible into cash. Following much of the relevant literature, all variables are deflated by capi-
tal K to adjust for heteroscedasticity.  
Equation (1) is the extended liquidity constrained hypothesis because it contains periods of normal 
time and bad time simultaneously. First, during a normal time, if the hypothesis holds true, then 
firms in the bank groups are not liquidity constrained but should bee constrained in the non-bank 
groups. This strongly suggests that 0)1(2 =a  and .0)2(2 >a  
During a bad time, a dummy variable, DAsia (year dummy) is created here, and it is zero in a pre-
financial crisis period (1991-1996) and unity in a post-financial crisis period (1997-2000); that is, 
⎩⎨
⎧=
;1997 0
;1997 1
before
after
DAsia  
where subscript N denotes the number of firms. When the sample in bank groups is used, N is 208, 
but when firm data of non-bank groups are used, N = 849.1 Our extended liquidity constrained 
hypothesis argues that during a bad time, firms which are in a group without banks are further li-
quidity constrained because they cannot obtain funds from the equity market, either. Thus, it 
should be expected that the coefficient of liq/K AsiaD× , i.e., 0)2(6 >a  since combining this term 
with liq/K yields (2) (2)2 6( )a a+ liq/K during the Asian crisis. A positive )2(6a should suggest a lar-
ger sensitivity to cash flow during a bad time for a non-bank group. By contrast, it is expected that 
(1) (1)
2 6( )a a+  should be insensitive to cash flow for a bank group, suggesting 0)1(6 =a . 
B. Extended Liquidity Insurance Hypothesis 
Our second model, which is borrowed from Ferris et al. (2003), examines the role of banks but 
only during a bad time. Unlike the model with the whole sample used as discussed in the previous 
subsection, this model only uses firm data from the bank groups. The sample in our bank groups is 
further divided into two sub-groups based on the source of loans. In equation (2), when j = 1, it 
denotes that the loans are borrowed from banks in the same group; otherwise when j = 2, the loans 
are borrowed from banks in a different group. That is: 
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Where j  = 1, loans from banks in the same group;  
        = 2, loans from banks in a different group 
                                                          
1 Our estimation methods are the OLS, and the fixed effect and random effect of the panel data model. Equation (1) is esti-
mated using the firms of the bank groups first and then using the firms of the non-bank groups.   
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and subscript i denotes the i-th loan contract from the bank groups. Loan Amount is the amount of 
a loan a firm borrows from either a bank in the same group (j = 1) or a bank in a different group (j 
= 2). Total Debt is a firm’s total debt. Rate and Maturity denote the loan rate and loan period, re-
spectively. FAsset  and BAsset  are the total assets of the firms and banks respectively. Other 
dummy variables are considered so as to exclude possible missing variable misspecifications. 
Dummy variable DAsia is the Asian crisis dummy, as defined in equation (1). CoreD  is the core 
dummy, which is equal to unity if the core business of the group is financial business, and zero, 
otherwise. CollD  is the dummy of the collateral conditions when the borrowing takes place and is 
equal to unity when the loan has collateral, and zero, otherwise. DNew is the dummy which denotes 
unity if the loan is from a bank established after 1992; otherwise, it is zero1. This specification is 
not a part of panel data model because a firm may borrow more than once in a short period but 
none during other periods. The equation is estimated using the OLS. 
The liquidity insurance hypothesis is consistent with the profit stability hypothesis, as presented by 
Ferris et al. (2003). They have reported that a business group tends to smooth the profits of its 
firms, thus implying that the loan amounts from banks in the same group are expected to have in-
creased during the Asian crisis. The extended liquidity insurance hypothesis here is similar to their 
hypothesis but has two extensions. First, besides borrowing from banks in the same group, the case 
of borrowing from banks in the different groups is also considered here. Banks in different groups 
do not necessarily provide liquidity to a distressed group firm, which implies that coefficient of 
0)1(5 =b  and the coefficient of 0)2(5 >b .  
Next, the core business of a bank group is considered. While the above testing is straightforward, it 
may ignore the core role of a bank in a conglomerate. It is contended that the role of a bank may 
be reversed depending on the business strategy (i.e., the core business) of the bank group. If the 
core business of a bank group is related to financial services, i.e., it is a financial conglomerate, 
banks in the group may not rescue distressed firms since taking action may actually hurt the total 
wealth of the group more than if no action were taken. Even worse, a bank may cut the loans it 
provides to protect its profits if the distressed firms have little chance of surviving. By testing the 
coefficient on coreD , this reversed financial insurance hypothesis is investigated in that its core 
business is related to finance; that is: 0)1(6 ≤b and 0)2(6 =b  
V. Empirical Results 
A. Extended Liquidity Constrained Hypothesis  
Table 6 presents the estimated results of equation (1) using the fixed effect panel data model. The 
proxies of the liquidity variable are either OCF/K or Cash/K. With regard to the former, the coeffi-
cient of the OCF/K employing the bank group sample is significantly negative at the 10% level, 
thus supporting the over-investment hypothesis. This evidence parallels that in Ferris et al. (2003) 
in the case of Korea. Probably because of a surplus cash fund in a bank group, investments are 
undertaken even if its firms’ internal funds are decreasing. By contrast, the extended liquidity con-
strained hypothesis is supported for a non-bank group since the coefficient of interest is signifi-
cantly positive at the 10% level.  That is, asymmetric information indeed exists for a non-bank 
group. When Cash/K is employed as the proxy, the estimated results change but only minimally. 
The coefficients of Cash/K are insignificant and positively significant for the bank groups and 
non-bank groups, respectively. Overall, this confirms the liquidity role of a bank in a bank group.  
                                                          
1 Taiwan bank deregulation started in 1991 to allow for the setup of de nova banks. Hence, “new banks” denotes banks that 
have been established since 1991; by contrast, “old banks” are those which were established before 1991. 
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As for the extended liquidity constrained hypothesis, the estimated coefficients of 
( / ) AsiaLiq K D× are negative ( 894.0)1(6 −=a ) and positive ( 997.0)1(6 =a ) for the bank 
groups and non-bank groups, respectively. Both are significant at the 10% level, which demon-
strates that the extended liquidity constrained hypothesis is found to have gained support during 
the Asian crisis. For example, in the OCF/K case, when AsiaD =1, the coefficient 
(1) (1)
2 6( )a a+  is 
only 0.250 for the bank groups; contrast this with the coefficient (2) (2)2 6( )a a+  of 1.712 for the 
non-bank groups. The firms for non-bank groups may hold more cash for the future need of li-
quidity. In the Cash/K case, the two added coefficients are 0.003 and 1.255, respectively.  
B. Extended Liquidity Insurance Hypothesis 
Table 7 shows the estimated results from using equation (2). Three specifications are shown de-
pending on whether CoreD , BAsset or FAsset  and NewD  are used. As for loans borrowed from 
non-member banks, the coefficients of AsiaD , i.e., 
)2(
5b , are overwhelmingly significantly negative 
regardless of the specifications, suggesting that borrowing from non-member banks is likely to 
have been reduced during the Asian crisis. In contrast, borrowing from member banks seems to 
have increased or not to have changed since the coefficient of interest here, )1(5b , is either signifi-
cantly positive or insignificantly different from zero. Thus, member banks evidently did not offer 
more funds to their affiliates during the Asian crisis. The contrasting results of the two groups con-
firm the role of liquidity insurance. 
Recall that the role of a bank as a liquidity insurer may be reversed when the core business of a 
bank group is a financial service. This reversed role is tested by investigating the coefficient of 
AsiaCore DD × . Factoring out AsiaD , the coefficient ( Corejj Dbb )(7)(5 + ) of AsiaD is obtained. 
The coefficient of )1(7b  is found to be either insignificantly positive or significantly negative. That 
is, when the core activity of a bank group is a finance-related business, i.e., CoreD =1, the member 
banks most likely reduced the amount of their loans to their affiliates during the Asian crisis.  
Thus, the liquidity insurance hypothesis indeed holds true for those bank groups when their core 
businesses are not related to the financial sector. Conversely, the inverse liquidity insurance hy-
pothesis is supported when the core business is related to the financial sector.  
The estimated results of other variables are equally interesting. First, the coefficients of 
FAsset are overwhelmingly positive, indicative that the loan amount ratio is positively affected 
by the asset value of borrowing firms. Second, as the coefficients of Rate are significantly nega-
tive, the higher the loan rates are, the lower is the loan amount ratio expected to be. Third, it is 
evident that loan maturity does not affect the loan amount. Finally, evidently it is not crucial 
whether banks are new or old as far as lending amounts go. 
C. Further Discussion: An International Comparison 
Most of banks around the world belonged to either the government or to conglomerates and were 
forced to make loans on easy terms to firms that had good connections with powerful politicians or 
bureaucrats or to affiliated firms under the control of the same dominant shareholder. In Asia, 
many banks in Indonesia and Thailand were used to channel their depositors’ funds to their domi-
nant shareholders or to affiliated firms1. Banks in Malaysia performed better, because only a few 
banks belonged to conglomerates and because financial regulation was more effective. In particu-
                                                          
1 In Indonesia, banks were dominated by the state and private banks controlled by businesses and politicians, leading to 
collusion and corruption between political elite and big businesses. In Thailand, family-controlled banks were heavily 
involved in connected lending, even though the state and bureaucrats were less involved in the banking and big businesses. 
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lar, prohibitions on loans to related parties were enforced more strictly. In Korea, big businesses 
were for the most part prohibited from owning and controlling the major banks. The traditional 
banking theory predicts that banks with a stable long-term relationship with their corporate clients 
are considered to have an important corporate governance role, particularly when the firms face 
deteriorations in their performance. However, the term “relationship banking” or “relationship-
based banking” is often used to mean “connection-based banking”, which constitutes the core of 
the “crony capitalism” that many allege brought about the Asian crisis of 1997. Given poor gov-
ernance in the banks, which themselves are under the control of families or the government, con-
nection-based lending rather than relationship banking has been prevalent. 
On the other hand, relationship banking of theory in this paper is held to be most valuable in times 
of financial distress for borrowing firms. Among Japanese firms that experienced financial distress 
but recovered thereafter, firms in industrial groups (which thus had close financial relationships 
with their affiliated banks, suppliers, and customers) invested more and sold more after the onset 
of distress than non-group firms during 1978-1985. Similar results were found for non-group firms 
that nevertheless had strong ties to a MB with a high ratio of MB loans to total loans (Hoshi et al., 
1991; Okazaki and Horiuchi, 1990). Hall and Weinstein (2000) find that firms with a large share 
of bank loans from the top lender received more loans from that lender and all lenders in times of 
financial distress during 1983-1992. What is important is not the MB relationship, but concen-
trated debt-holding that mitigates the free-rider problem and facilitates the MB’s role as a coordi-
nator of the creditors. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper discusses the roles of a bank in bank and non-bank conglomerates, roles which are best 
investigated during a bad period. What we examine are two hypotheses using Taiwan’s unique 
bank loan transaction data. 
On the basis of the above review of empirical evidence, what can be said about the behavior of 
relationship banks or the merits and demerits of relationship banking? Evidence on the positive 
role of relationship banking seems to be fairly strong in at least three aspects. It gives client firms 
better access to credit, alleviating liquidity constraints in investment activity; it reduces the costs of 
financial distress as the banks can provide better care to troubled firms, often intervening in their 
management; and it tends to reduce the business risk of the firms. Firms with a close banking rela-
tionship generally do better in financial crisis, though they are affected more severely when their 
own relationship banks fall into serious distress. Evidence on the extraction of monopoly rents by 
relationship banks from client firms is mixed, although this tendency seems to be rather evident for 
Japanese main banks. In spite of the increased availability of credit, firms with a close banking 
relationship tend to grow more slowly than other firms, as the banks discourage risky projects. 
Finally, the evidence on corporate efficiency and profits is rather negative. 
First, our extended liquidity constrained hypothesis cannot be rejected. The hypothesis argues that 
during a bad period, investments of firms in a non-bank group are more severely financial con-
strained than they are during a normal period. Our study fully confirms this. Firms in a bank 
group, however, are not financial constrained in either a normal or a bad period. Besides this, dur-
ing a normal time, firms in a bank group are prone to be over-invest, meaning that they invest even 
though their cash flow is lacking. This is probably attributed to the fact that they have full confi-
dence that they can obtain funds.  
Second, our extended liquidity insurance hypothesis is also unambiguously supported. This hy-
pothesis claims that the core business of bank groups may affect the attitude toward rescuing dis-
tressed firms. Our empirical results show that the liquidity insurance hypothesis indeed holds true 
for those bank groups whose core businesses are not related to the financial sector. Conversely, the 
inverse liquidity insurance hypothesis is supported when the core business is related to the finan-
cial sector. 
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Table 1 
 Bank Business Groups 
This table shows the detailed information of 15 bank business groups. Column 1 and Column 2 list the names 
of the bank groups and their member bank, respectively. Column 3 lists the structure of the ownership by the 
controlling shareholders and their related firms. Column 4 shows the names of the core business (A), other 
non-financially related firms (B), other financially related firms (C), and the characteristics of the group’s 
business (D). The information of Column 4 is from the CCIS’s records. CCIS classifies three types of the 
business strategy of the groups: diversification, focus on financially related industry, and Double-focus on the 
general industries and financially related industry.    
Group’s Name Member Bank 
Name  
(TSEC code) 
Largest Share 
Held by A: 
Person B: 
Person and 
Related Firms 
C: A+ B    
A: Core Business  
B: Other Non-Financially Related Firms 
C: Other Financially Related Firms  
D: The Characteristics of the Group’s Business 
1. Yuen-Foong 
Group 
International 
Bank of Taipei 
(2808) 
A: 2.38 
B: 18.05 
C: 20.43 
A: Yuen-Foong Paper Co. 
B: China Color Printing, Union Paper, Yuen-Foong-Yu  
Paper MFG, Shin-Foong Chemical Industry, Taiwan Hopax 
Chemicals MFG, Perk Crown Paper, Ray Foong, Shen’s Art 
Printing, Hsin-Yi Recreation, Shin-Yti, Boardteck 
Electronics, Prime View International 
C: None 
D: Diversification 
2. China-Trust 
Group 
China Trust 
Commercial 
Bank (2815) 
A: 8.14 
B: 16.28 
C: 24.42 
A: China Trust Commercial Bank 
B: United Advertising, China Synthetic Rubber, Grand 
Pacific Petrochemicals, Chie-Ho Engineering and 
Development, Wyse Technology Taiwan, Trace Storage 
Technology, KG Telecommunications, Ho- -Hsin Land 
Consulting, Giga Media 
C: Grand Pacific Securities Investment Trust, China 
Securities, China Life Insurance, China Trust Investment 
D: Focus 
3. President Group Grand 
Commercial 
Bank (2828) 
4.17 
11.57 
C. 15.74 
A: President Enterprises Co.  
B: President Chain Store, Prince Housing and Development, 
Universal Cement, Tainan Spinning, Nanlien International, 
Ton-Yi Industrial, Test Union, Mospec Semi-conductor, 
President Pharmaceuticals 
C: President Securities, Nan-Fan Investment 
D: Diversification 
4. Wal-Sin Li-Hwa 
Group 
Dah-An 
Commercial 
Bank (2829) 
2.25 
14.81 
17.06 
 
A: Wal-Sin Li-Hwa Co. 
B: Wal-Sin Technology, Lih-Hwa Truck, Wha-Yo Electronic 
Materials, Winbond Electronics, Hannstar Board, Integral 
Chemical, Wal-Sin Advanced Electronics, Kolin 
Construction and Development, Wal-Sin Li-Hwa Holding 
C: Han-Yo Investment and Development 
D: Diversification 
5. Re-Bar Group The Chinese 
Bank (2831) 
2.12 
18.52 
20.64 
 
A: China Re-Bar 
B: Far-Eastern Silo Shipping, Re-Bar Construction 
Development, Chia Hsin Food and Synthetic Fiber, Eastern 
Broadcasting, Eastern Multimedia 
C: Union Insurance, Chinese Bills Finance, 
D: Diversification 
6. Cathay Group Cathay United 
Bank (2835) 
4.94 
8.87 
13.81 
 
A: Cathay Life Insurance, Cathay Construction 
B: San-Ching Engineering, Cathay General Hospital 
C: Tong-Tai Insurance 
D: Double-focus 
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Table 1 (continued) 
7. Ruentex Group Sino-Pac Bank 
(2839)  
5.93 
14.28 
20.21 
 
A: Ruentex Construction and Development 
B: Ruentex Industries, Ruentex Construction and 
Engineering, Kwang-Hua Development and Investment, 
Ruentex Cement, Ruentex Leaning, Rt-Mart International  
C: Fu-Hua Securities, Fun-Hwa Investment Trust, Kwang-
Hua Securities Investment Consultants, Kwang-Hua 
Securities Investments and Trust, Sino-Pac Securities, 
Ruentex Investment,  
D: Diversification 
8. Fu-Bon Group Fu-Bon 
Commercial 
Bank (2842) 
2.65 
14.87 
17.52 
 
A: Fu-Bon Insurance 
B: Fu-Bon Construction Management, Formosa Land 
Development 
C: Fu-Bon Futures, Fu-Bon Securities, Fu-Bon Life 
Insurance, Fu-Bon Securities Investment Trust, Fu-Bon 
Securities Finance, Fu-Bon Development and Investment, 
Fu-Bon Bills Finance 
D: Focus 
9. Shin-Kong 
Group 
Tai-Shin 
International 
Bank (2844) 
1.63 
11.71 
13.34 
 
A: Shin-Kong Co., Ltd. 
B: Shin-Kong Spinning, Shin-Hai Gas, Shin-Kong Synthetic 
Fibers, Shin-Kong Construction and Development, Taiwan 
SOGO 
C: Shin-Kong Insurance, Shin-Kong Leasing, Taiwan 
Securities, Taiwan Securities Investment Trust Shin-Kong 
Security, Shin-Kong Life Insurance 
D: Focus 
10. Far-East Group Far-Eastern 
International 
Bank (2845) 
4.45 
13.88 
18.33 
 
A: Far-Eastern Construction 
B: Far-Eastern Development Stores, Oriental Union 
Chemical, Far-Eastern Textile, Asia Cement, U-Ming Marine 
Transport, Far-Eastern Dupont 
C: Oriental Securities, Yuang-Ding Investments 
D: Diversification 
11. Hua-Eng Group Cheng-Shin 
Commercial 
Bank (2846) 
1.10 
9.54 
10.64 
 
A: Hwa-Eng Wire and Cable 
B: First Copper and Iron Industrial, Hua-Well Electronic 
C: None 
D: Diversification 
12. En-Tie Group En-Tie 
Commercial 
Bank (2849) 
3.29 
15.01 
18.30 
 
A: Hung-Tai Construction 
B: Hung-Sheng Construction, Cooperative Construction 
C: Hung-Fu Life Insurance 
D: Diversification 
13. Ever-Fortune 
Group 
Pan-Asia 
Commercial 
Bank (5810) 
3.87 
9.85 
13.72 
 
A: Ever-Fortune Industrial 
B: Ever-Fortune Recreation, Chang-Sheng Contractor, 
Chang-Shun Construction, Chen-Hsin Construction, Hung-
Yi Construction and Development, Everpower  Co., Chang-
Cheong Construction and Development, Yi-Deh 
Environment Protection Technology 
C: Chang-Sheng Investment, Chia-Yi Securities, Pan Asia 
International Development, Pan Asia Commodity 
D: Diversification 
14. Jih-Sun Group Jih-Sun 
Commercial 
Bank (Baodao 
Commercial 
Bank, 5817) 
1.03 
4.92 
5.95 
 
 
A: Jih-Sun Securities 
B: Network Securities Investment 
C: Jih-Sun International Leasing and Finance, Jih-Sun 
Securities Investment Trust, Jih-Sun Securities Investment 
Consulting, Jih-Sun Futures, Jih-Sun Securities International 
Holdings, Jih-Sun Securitues Service 
D: Focus 
15. Chin-Fon 
Group 
28976  
Chin-Fon 
Commercial 
Bank (2897) 
 
2.41 
8.73 
11.14 
 
A: San-Yang Industry 
B: Fong-Ta Trading, United Chinese Leasing, San-Yang 
Construction, Nan-Yang Industries, Chao-Yang Electronic 
Components, Hi-Chung Co., Chin-Fon Semiconductor and 
Technology 
C: King-Hoe Securities, San-Yang Investment 
D: Diversification 
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Table 2 
Non-Bank Business Groups 
This table lists the names of 152 non-bank business groups by CCIS’s records. The CCIS always lists the 
name of the core business to represent the name of the business group. Number in the parentheses denotes the 
number of business groups in the classified industry. 
Tier 1: Core Business: Finance Industries (Sub-Total=8) 
Grand Cathay Securities, Yuan Ta Securities, Entrust Securities, Asia Securities, Taiwan International Securities, Concord 
Securities, First Taiwan, Capital Investment, Polaris Securities 
Tier 2: Core Business: International Trading Industries (Sub-Total=3) 
Mercuries and Associates, Sino-Japan (Enterprise Bank of Hualien), Collins 
Tier 3: Core Business: Electronic Industries (Sub-Total=30) 
Umax Data Systems, Tatung, First International Computer, CTX Opto-Electronics, CMC Magnetics, U-lead Systems, Ad-
vanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE), Tekcon Electronics, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, Taiwan Communi-
cation System, Taiwan Semiconductor Life on Electronics, ACER, Kinpo, Chi Mei, Gvc, Mosel Vitelic, Enlight, Yageo, 
Asustek, Avermedia, ADI, Green-point, Quanta Computer, Aurora, Action Electronics, Tsann Kuen, United Microelectron-
ics, Hon Hai Precision Industry 
Tier 4: Core Business: Traditional Industries (Sub-Total=111) 
Pacific Electric Wire and Cable, Rexon Industrial, Lealea, Vidar-Sms, Ta Chen Stain Less Pipe, Great Wall, Taya Electric 
Wire and Cable, Tah Tong Textiles, Continental Engineering Group, Ta Jung Transportation, Mountain Group, Falcon 
Cycle-Parts, China Unique Garments MFG, Ctci, Chung Shing Textiles, China Steel, China Man-Made Fiber, Fu Tsu Con-
struction, Jen Ho (Chih Lien Industrial), Lio Ho, Pacific Construction, Radium Construction, Tidehold Development, Taiwan 
Cement, Taiwan Spinning, Formosa Plastics, Tai Roun, USI Far East Group, Taiwan Pineapple, Ever-Light Chemical In-
dustrial, Taiwan Glasses, Taiwan Pulp and Paper, Taiwan Tea, Giant Manufacturing, Cheng Long, Cheng Shin Robber, 
Yung Tay Engineering, Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Lily Textile, Shihlin Electric, Kwang Yang Motor, Roo Hsing Garment, 
An Feng Steel, Nien Hsing Textile, Hong Ho, Hong Chou, Hung Tai, Hung Kuo, Horng Chung, Chia Heir, Vedan, Ve 
Woong, Wei Chuan, Ho Cheng, Teco Electric and Machinery, Tung Ho Steel, Southeast Cement, Tuntex International 
Dynamics, Chou Chin, King Car, Chang Ku Building, Chang Chun, Evergreen Group, Nan Pao Resins Chemical, Nam Yeh, 
Y.H. and T. Woidtke Chemical Industrial, Core Pacific, Kenda Rubber Ind., Maywufa, Chun Yu, Chun Yuan Steel Industry, 
Nice Enterprise, Anderson, Taisun, Test-rite, Hotai, New Sun, Ability Enterprise, Coldsun Development and Construction, 
Kou Feng, Worthy, Chief Construction, Pharos, Fu Sheng, Audix, China Airlines, Hualon, Yangming Marine, Shung Ye 
Mortors, SDI Corporation, Fortune Motors, Ideal Bike, Ching Yeh, S&T Copper Industrial, Shin Yih Fiber Industrial, Sampo, 
Wabhai Lines and Shihlin Paper, Chicony, Yulon Mortors, Tah Hsin Industrial, Chi Industrial, Chi Hsin Cement, Fui Indus-
trial, Falcon Machine Tools, Fusel Industrial Products, Vector Machinery Works, Men Yi, Far East Machinery, Ever-top Wire 
Cable, Sinnon, Corner, Long Bon Development, Yieh Long Enterprise, UB Office Systems, Lian Hwa Foods, Lien Hwa 
Industry, Fong Kuo, Holmsgreen, Feng Hsin,Les Enphants, Pou Chen, Bao Chen Construction, Taiwan Sakura 
Table 3  
Basic Characteristics: Bank Groups and Non-Bank Groups 
This table shows the number of firms in each industry for bank groups and non-bank groups. The industry is 
classified to six groups: Banking and Insurance (6), Securities (7), International Trading (8), Electronics 
(New Economy, 9), Traditional (Old Economy, 10), and Investment or Holding Companies (11) 
 Bank Groups Non-Bank Groups Total 
(1) Number of Groups 15 152 167 
(2) Number of Firms Listed on the TSEC or OTC 57 295 352 
(3) Number of Firms Publicly Issuing 151 554 705 
(4) Number of Firms Not in (2) or (3)  89 108 182 
Total Number of Firms 
(5)=(2)+(3)+(4) =(6)+(7)+(8)+(9)+(10)+(11) 
297 1,109 1,406 
Number of Firms in Each Industry 
(6) Banking and Insurance 25 9 34 
(7) Securities  28 23 51 
(8) International Trading 41 94 135 
(9) Electronics (New Economy) 52 295 347 
(10) Traditional (Old Economy) 69 401 470 
(11) Investment or Holding Companies 82 287 369 
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Table 4  
Borrowing Terms: Bank Groups and Non-Bank Groups 
Column 1 and Column 2 compare the borrowing terms of bank groups from their member banks and the non-
member banks. Column 3 shows the borrowing terms of non-bank groups. 
 Bank Group  
Member Banks 
Bank Group 
Non-Member Banks 
Non-Bank 
Groups 
A. Number of Contracts 20,453 1,167 58,532 
B. Borrowing Interest Rate (%) 
Mean 7.58 7.71 7.95 
Standard deviation  1.19 1.17 1.76 
Maximum 8.76 8.95 10.94 
Minimum 3.00 4.12 3.00 
C. Borrowing Amounts (NT$: Thousands) 
Mean 12,423 12,651 14,913 
Standard deviation 23,519 29,144 31,042 
Maximum 85,294 87,952 90,354 
Minimum 10,067 9,135 7,016 
D. Borrowing Maturity (Years) 
Mean 3.37 3.42 2.95 
Standard deviation 3.17 2.65 3.05 
Maximum 9.18 10.25 12.53 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E. Proportion of Loans with Collateral (%) 
Mean 52.45 37.09 59.14 
 
Table 5 
 Definitions of the Variables 
This table shows the definitions of variables in equation (1) and equation (2). 
Proxy Variables Definition 
I   Investment Change in the amount of gross investment 
K Capital Long-term debt plus equity (scaling variable) 
Q Tobin’s Q ratio Ratio of the market value of outstanding stocks divided by the book 
value of total assets taken to the replacement costs in the next pe-
riod 
Liq  Liquidity Two proxies: 
OCF: Operating Cash Flow  
Cash: Corporate cash and its equivalents  
PD Production Firm’s sales revenues 
DAsia Asian crisis dummy =1, before the Asian crisis (1991-1996) 
=0, after the Asian crisis (1997-2000) 
Liq/K ×DAsia  Interaction term  
Amount Loan amount Total borrowing amount  
Debt Total debt Total debt  
DCore  Strategic develop-
ment  
Core business of the group 
=1, financial business 
=0, non-financial business 
DColl Collateral =1, with collateral 
=0, without collateral 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Proxy Variables Definition 
Rate  Borrowing interest 
rate 
Note: if floating interest rate is used, the average rate is adopted 
(=(max+min)/2) 
Maturity  Borrowing maturity  Deadline-the starting day/365 
FAsset  Firms’ assets Total assets of borrowing firms  
BAsset  
Banks’ assets Total assets of lending banks 
NewD  
Dummy of borrowing 
from a new bank 
=1, borrowing from a new bank 
=0, otherwise 
 
Table 6 
The Regression Results of Hypothesis 1: Extended Liquidity Constrained Hypothesis 
This table focuses on the fixed effects of the relation between the real investment and their liquidity for the 
bank groups (j=1) and non-bank groups (j=2). To conserve space, we do not report the similar results of the 
random effects. The definitions of dependent variables are as Table 5 shows. Q denotes Tobin’s Q, which is 
measured as the ratio of the market value of the outstanding stocks divided by the book value of total assets 
taken to the replacement costs in the next period (t+1). Term Liq is the index of liquidity, which is typically 
proxied by a corporate operating cash flow (OCF), and the sum of cash holdings and short-term securities 
(CASH) as an alternative measure. PD represents the firm’s production and is defined as “sales plus change 
in the final inventory of goods. Term K denotes the capital, which is equal to long-term debt plus equity and 
serves as a scale variable. The number in the parentheses is the t value. *** is significant at 1%, ** is 
significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. 
 Fixed Effects 
Variables Bank Groups 
(j=1) 
Non-Bank Groups 
(j=2) 
Bank Groups 
(j=1) 
Non-Bank Groups 
(j=2) 
Qt+1 0.997 
(1.476) 
1.553** 
(1.971) 
0.412 
(1.003) 
0.561 
(1.001) 
OCF t-1/K t-1 -0.004* 
(-1.706) 
0.692* 
(1.800) 
-- -- 
CASH t-1/K t-1 -- -- 
0.924 
(1.025) 
0.258* 
(1.651) 
PDt/K t-1 0.007 
(1.036) 
1.465* 
(1.692) 
0.348 
(1.367) 
0.442 
(1.395) 
PDt-1/K t-2 -0.756 
(-0.315) 
-1.445 
(-1.025) 
1.782 
(1.117) 
0.666 
(1.225) 
Liq/K×DAsia  0.254 
(0.000) 
1.020 
(1.531) 
-0.894** 
(-1.902) 
0.997* 
(1.697) 
Adj-R2 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.14 
Sample Number 208 849 208 849 
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Table 7 
The Regression Results of Hypothesis 2: Extended Liquidity Insurance Hypothesis 
This table shows the OLS estimates of the relation between the loan amounts and the characteristics of the 
two business group. j = 1 denotes loans from banks in the same group; j= 2 denotes loans from the banks in a 
different group (non-member bank). The independent variable Loan Amount is the amount of a loan a firm 
borrows from either a bank in the same group (j = 1) or a bank in a different group (j = 2), and is scaled by 
firm’s Total Debt. The definitions of other dependent variables are as Table 5 shows. DAsia is the Asian crisis 
dummy, which is equal to unity before the Asian crisis (1991-1996). DCore is the core dummy, which is equal 
to unity if the core business of the group is financial business, and zero, otherwise. DNew is the dummy which 
denotes unity if the loan is from a bank established after 1992; otherwise, it is zero. Dcoll is the dummy of the 
collateral conditions when the borrowing takes place and is equal to unity when the loan has collateral, and 
zero, otherwise. Rate and Maturity denote the loan rate and loan period, respectively. AssetF and AssetB are 
respectively the total assets of the firms and banks. The number in the parentheses is the t value. *** is 
significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Member 
Bank 
(j=1) 
Non- 
Member Bank 
(j=2) 
Member 
Bank 
(j=1) 
Non-Member 
Bank 
(j=2) 
Member 
Bank 
(j=1) 
Non- Mem-
ber Bank 
(j=2) 
Intercept 1.529* 
(1.757) 
0.265 
(0.984) 
-1.158 
(-1.447) 
-0.075 
(-0.802) 
1.104 
(1.391) 
-1.691 
(-1.005) 
DAsia 1.145* 
(1.702) 
0.574 
(1.541) 
-0.238 
(-1.456) 
-1.758** 
(-2.015) 
0.957* 
(1.671) 
-1.445** 
(-1.996) 
DCore  
-- 
 
-- 
-1.381** 
(-1.965) 
0.985 
(1.008) 
-0.562** 
(-2.191) 
1.425 
(0.957) 
DCore * DAsia 0.764 
(1.238) 
1.265 
(0.926) 
-1.521* 
(-1.672) 
0.463* 
(1.671) 
-0.891* 
(-1.803) 
-.536 
(-1.364) 
DColl  651* 
(1.662) 
0.893 
(1.274) 
1.253*** 
(2.546) 
1.154 
(1.528) 
-0.006 
(-0.000) 
1.624** 
(1.894) 
Rate -2.564 
(-1.567) 
0.457 
(0.843) 
-1.628* 
(-1.691) 
0.056 
(1.541) 
1.008* 
(1.721) 
1.315* 
(1.758) 
Maturity -1.268 
(-0.067) 
-1.587 
(-1.268) 
1.524 
(1.339) 
1.663 
(0.843) 
-1.335 
(-1.560) 
1.057 
(0.697) 
AssetF 0.236 
(1.598) 
0.932 
(1.897)** 
- - 
-0.057 
(-1.267) 
0.367* 
(1.705) 
AssetB - 
-1.125 
(-0.728) 
- - - - 
DNew -0.364 
(-1.007) 
0.645 
(1.438) 
- - 
-0.556 
(-1.354) 
1.629 
(1.624) 
Adj-R2 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.17 
Sample Number 1,167 20,453 1,167 20,453 1,167 20,453 
 
